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Introduction 
We are caught within the web weaved by culture, society, and the institutions that 
pervade the two. Within the intertwined aspects of the human experience there lies a concept of 
identity, which is sometimes quoted as being the most familiar aspect of this experience. Who 
am I and how have I become this “I?” The formation of the self has long been debated: are we 
born with an identity, or an inherent essence, or does it begin to take shape after we interact with 
the world? Is interaction with the world necessary for a formation of an identity? There could 
possibly be a combination of the two. This debate is familiar in different disciplines: philosophy 
and the debate on essence versus existence, psychology and the debate on nature versus nurture, 
and within religious contexts with the debate on divine creation and chance.  
Throughout this paper I will be arguing that identity is certainly shaped through an 
interaction with the world, and without the context of the world then a definitive identity would 
be hard to articulate. For this to be done, I will begin my paper by defining the concept of 
visibility and how visibility plays a pertinent role in the formation of an identity. Visibility 
should not be taken as solely the act of being observed; it turns out to be more complex than that. 
Visibility also constitutes the space where people come together to disclose themselves and 
information about the world. Within the spaces of visibility there is also a role that repetitive 
discourse and cultural intelligibility play within the context of identity formation. Repetitive 
discourse is when norms, identity shaping norms in particular, are repeated within a space of 
visibility so that they become intelligible to other beings. Cultural intelligibility implies that the 
repetitive utterance of the norm has created a definitive identity. I will elaborate more on 
Honors Senior Thesis | Shelby Purdy 
 
3 
 
discursive practices, cultural intelligibility, and visibility later on in my paper. Afterwards I will 
be dividing my paper into two main sections: “spaces of surveillance” and “spaces of 
appearance.” The two main thinkers that I will be using to further my discussion are Michel 
Foucault and Hannah Arendt. The former section will be dedicated to Foucault and will focus on 
those spaces of visibility where the main purpose is correction and conformity. The latter section 
will encompass Arendt’s theories about how certain spaces of visibility provide a positive power 
to those within that space. In other words, “spaces of surveillance” subjugate and “spaces of 
appearance” empower. Both thinkers argue that these spaces of visibility allow for an identity to 
be disclosed and possibly formed by the visibility that the world provides. To expand the 
discussion of how visibility and the reinforcement of culturally intelligible iterations have an 
impact on identity I will be using feminist thought to detail how the concept of gender is 
constructed through the visibility within “spaces of surveillance” and “spaces of appearance.” 
Once I have described both spaces thoroughly, I will show that Foucault’s “space of 
surveillance” is a necessary yet limiting view about identity formation. What the “space of 
surveillance” lacks the “space of appearance” will supplement. Neither space can be ignored; 
rather, both are necessary for a dense view towards identity formation. 
Visibility 
Before delving into “spaces of surveillance” or “spaces of appearance,” it is important to 
describe the role of visibility within both spaces. Visibility should not be seen as solely the act of 
being viewed. While the gaze itself is an important aspect of visibility, it is not the only mode of 
visibility in the context of this paper. Visibility is the state of existing within a world that does 
not allow for total isolation. To exist within the world is to be visible to others, and this visibility 
is inescapable. Visibility can be seen as a presentation or a disclosure of oneself to other beings. 
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Existing within the world inevitably implies that one is presenting oneself to others, whether or 
not the presentation is deliberate. Foucault uses the concept of visibility to further explain how 
his theory of power forms subjects, and Arendt uses the concept of visibility to describe how 
subjects disclose themselves in the presence of others and how subjects can use visibility for 
empowerment. Visibility is not simply the act of being viewed and viewing another; rather, 
visibility is the process of observing, contemplating what has been observed, and then using the 
knowledge gained from the visibility to either shape a subject or gain insight into who the subject 
is. While visibility itself is necessary for the formation of an identity, the concept of repetitive 
discursive practice is also a component to identity formation. Without recurring normative 
identity discourse, then the identity itself would not reach cultural intelligibility and would hold 
no weight on an identity formation. Neve Gordon describes the importance of visibility in the 
context of a space of surveillance:  
“Visibility is essential to power not only because it is put to use by power in order to 
control people, but perhaps more importantly because it is power’s condition of 
possibility. Discursive practices, for instance, are meaningless and powerless if they are 
not visible . . . discursive practices are actually created, reproduced, and upheld through 
visible citation and repetition of their normative fiats. Conversely, if a discursive practice 
ceases to be articulated by constant repetition, it loses its power and may eventually 
disappear. Thus, the practice maintains its power only insofar as it is visible” (Gordon, 
132). 
Without visibility, the norms that shape subjects will cease to exist, because for something to 
become a norm it has to be repetitively visible for it to take hold within a society. Without the 
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norms discussed by Foucault being seen and heard, they hold no sway on the shaping of subjects 
in any sense of the phrase.  
In Arendt’s work, The Human Condition, visibility is not used in order to correct, control, 
and ultimately form the subject, but rather is used in order to empower the subjects within the 
domain of visibility. Visibility and repetitive discursive practices discussed by Arendt are used in 
a positive way in that the subjects within the “space of appearance” are able to disclose 
themselves as subjects (instead of being made into a subject within the “space of surveillance”). 
The visibility within this space allows for the subjects to incite attention and possibly change 
based off the feedback of this attention. The visibility within a “space of appearance” is less 
dogmatic, unlike the “space of surveillance,” where the repetitive discursive practices are 
creating norms that people are meant to abide by. Within the “space of appearance” the repetitive 
discursive practices create an intelligible identity through free disclosure. Visibility, in this broad 
sense of existing in the world and presenting oneself to others at all times, is a key feature of 
both Foucault’s and Arendt’s work and is key to identity shaping.  
 Now that I have articulated what visibility is within the context of my paper, I am now 
able to explore the two different spaces of visibility—“spaces of surveillance” and “spaces of 
appearance.” I will begin in the “space of surveillance” because Foucault’s work gives a more 
determinist view of how a subject is shaped. While Arendt is not directly responding to Foucault 
in her concept of  the “space of appearance,” I will be able to use her work to create my own 
response to his more restrictive view about identity formation. Once I have evaluated Foucault’s 
stance within “space of surveillance” and shown how the visibility within this space shapes an 
identity, I will delve into Arendt’s theories about the “space of appearance.” After elaborating on 
both spaces I will show how Foucault’s discussion on identity is necessary because it is 
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impossible to completely eliminate the institutions that effect an identity, but I will also show 
how taking the “space of surveillance” alone is a limiting view about identity formation. An 
identity does not simply have to be a creature intuitional frameworks. Arendt and the “space of 
appearance” provide a supplement to the limiting discussion concerning the “space of 
surveillance.” It cannot be denied that there are particular normative institutions that effect the 
way we see identities, such as, binary gender identities. The “space of appearance” allows an 
individual to challenge the binaries and the restrictive “space of surveillance” by disclosing an 
identity that does not abide by the institutional frameworks that pervade the world.   
Space of Surveillance (Michel Foucault) 
The first space of visibility that I will be discussing is the “space of surveillance” that is 
emphasized in Foucault. The “space of surveillance” exists in many different aspects of society 
and to escape it is nearly impossible. Visibility is evident in a “space of surveillance” by the 
name alone and it is an integral part to identity formation within these spaces. Surveillance 
implies visibility, but these spaces are not meant to depict solely an overseeing gaze. The power 
relations that exist within these spaces function because of visibility and use visibility to achieve 
the goals within a “space of surveillance”: correction, conformity, and control. To explain how 
identity is shaped within a “space of surveillance” I will be using Foucault’s works Discipline 
and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Volume 1.  
Power 
From a Foucauldian standpoint, power relations are the means to which an identity is formed 
within a “space of surveillance.” Specifically, Foucault uses disciplinary power to describe the 
subtle yet extensive practices used to shape an identity, but it is important to describe his general 
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notion of power before delving into what exactly disciplinary power is. He does not see power as 
something that can be possessed by one person or even one group of people; rather, power is to 
be taken as relational.           
“Power is not something that is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on 
to or allows to slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points, in the interplay of 
nonegalitarian and mobile relations.  Relations of power are not in a position of 
exteriority with respect to other types of relationships (economic processes, knowledge 
relationships, sexual relations), but are immanent in the latter; they are the immediate 
effects of the divisions, inequalities, and disequilibriums which occur in the latter, and 
conversely they are the internal conditions of these differentiations; relations of power are 
not in superstructural positions, with merely a role of prohibition or accompaniment; they 
have a directly productive role, wherever they come into play. Power comes from below; 
that is, there is no binary and all-encompassing opposition between rulers and ruled at the 
root of power relations, and serving as a general matrix—no such duality extending from 
the top down and reacting on more and more limited groups to the very depths of the 
social body” (Foucault, 95). 
Power is everywhere all at once—it is omnipresent without being dictatorial. While still being 
omnipresent, it takes analysis to truly notice the power relations at play within a society. It isn’t 
visible like a sovereign power is visible. The head of the king has been cut off, and the power 
resides within the relational discourses in any particular institution. The power exists because of 
the reiteration of normative ways of being, and the reiteration itself is what makes the norms 
concrete and capable of being applied to individuals. Repetitive discursive practices make the 
elusive form of spoken word normative. The diffuse nature of this relational power results in the 
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subtle coercions of character and this is what disciplinary power is born out of. The norms that 
shape identity are created within these visible “spaces of surveillance” through repetitive 
discursive practices, and once the norms are created, they can be enforced upon individuals. 
Once the norms are used to coerce individuals, disciplinary power comes into play, and 
individuals are meant to internalize the normative discourse.  
Disciplinary Power 
To make more concrete this somewhat elusive, general notion of power, Foucault 
examines how discipline is enacted through the power relations discussed previously. Within the 
chapter “Discipline” in the book Discipline and Punish, Foucault examines how the subject is 
created through the institutions that use discipline as a corrective means. For Foucault, the 
subject is produced as an effect of power used within disciplinary institutions. The subject does 
not exist and then enter into the institutions; rather, the institutions create the subject. Foucault 
begins by explaining that in the 1800s sovereign power ceases to reign supreme, and once 
disciplinary power took hold, individuals were corrected from the inside out. Disciplinary power 
is exercised on the body and through the body. This power causes the individual to internalize 
the disciplines and to act in accordance with the norm that is admirable within the institution in 
question. The disciplines become internalized through the repetitive nature of the disciplinary 
practices, and the conforming and corrected identity that is shaped becomes culturally intelligible 
through the recurring disciplinary discursive practices. 
Since Foucault wants to argue that an identity does not exist before an interaction with 
institutions, he begins with a section entitled “Docile Bodies.” He discusses how malleable the 
body is and how it can be treated as an object and be shaped by the subtle, detailed, repetitive 
disciplinary powers at play. Docile bodies are to be seen as formless, and through the 
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disciplinary power a subject is formed out of this shapeless, impressionable body. Bodies are 
seen as a means within disciplinary power and they are shaped accordingly. It is not that the 
body itself is shaped; rather, a malleable body is necessary for the shaping of an identity. The 
disciplinary practices act on the body to correct the internal and external behaviors of the body, 
and this in turn shapes the identity of the individual to which the body belongs. He provides a 
concrete example of this by using the soldier of the seventeenth century. A peasant was taken 
from his home and turned into a soldier. The methods of physical stance, weaponry, and attitude 
become automatic, and the peasant has been transformed into a coordinated fighting machine by 
the calculated, precise disciplines of the military. Through disciplinary power people are seen to 
be differentiated, because to individualize the masses and correct each allows for greater control 
within the group as a whole. In other words, to correct and train the individual is to control the 
mass as well. The docile body is shaped into a subject through these detailed disciplinary 
methods. The peasant is trained to become a soldier, and once a soldier always a soldier. His 
identity is tied up with the act of being a soldier and without the repetitive disciplinary practices 
that are placed upon the peasant then the soldier of the seventeenth century would not be 
culturally intelligible. It is more efficient and economic if the power can mold the individual into 
the type of being that is desirable to the particular institution. 
“The historical moment of the disciplines was the moment when an art of the human 
body was born, which was directed not only at the growth of its skills, nor at the 
intensification of its subjection, but at the formation of a relation that in the mechanism 
itself makes it more obedient as it becomes more useful, and conversely. What was then 
being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calculated manipulation 
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of its elements, its gestures, and its behavior. The human body was entering a machinery 
of power that explores it, breaks it down, and rearranges it” (Foucault, 138). 
The importance of these detailed coercions was how it invested and controlled the body. Once 
the disciplines were internalized, then the specific institution (hospital, military, factory, school, 
etc.) will function more smoothly. Without having to take the time to exercise sovereignty and 
with the capability to make diffuse the understated but impactful disciplinary methods, 
controlling the multitude of bodies becomes an efficient, productive, and economical process. 
To use disciplinary power to shape the docile bodies into subjects there are three steps 
required that all incorporate visibility in the broad sense that I described earlier: hierarchical 
observation, normalizing judgement, and an examination. Both the norms and the subjects they 
are being applied to are visible under this three tiered disciplinary mechanism. The norms are 
enforced by the disciplinary mechanisms to train “the moving, confused, useless multitudes of 
bodies and forces into a multiplicity of individual elements – small, separate cells, organic 
autonomies, genetic identities and continuities, combinatory segments” (Foucault, 170). The 
hierarchical observation, normalizing judgement, and examination are all applied to each 
individual within the framework of disciplinary power. These three necessary features to forming 
an identity within the “space of surveillance” would not be possible without the visibility and the 
repetitive nature that is inherent in their methods.  
Hierarchical observation ensures that each individual, of any rank, is being watched, 
studied, and coerced into abiding by the norm set in place through their visibility. Through being 
made visible at all times, an individual will be easier to study and ultimately train. This constant 
observation is what allows for the study of individual differences and the gained knowledge on 
what the norm is, what the norm should be, and how to ultimately enforce the ideal norm upon 
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those who are being observed. Without the broad context of visibility, where individuals are 
constantly existing within a world of presentation and disclosure, then the observation would be 
impossible. Visibility does not imply observation only, but observation requires visibility. To 
explain how disciplinary power uses observation as a technology of power, Foucault discusses 
the change within the architecture of military camps, hospitals, schools, and factories by 
explaining how the old theme of enclosure and confinement has been replaced by methods of 
transparency and constant visibility. This allows for better observation and better control over the 
actions and conduct of the individuals under surveillance. “This infinitely scrupulous concern 
with surveillance is expressed in the architecture by innumerable petty mechanisms. These 
mechanisms can only be seen as unimportant if one forgets the role of this instrumentation, 
minor but flawless, in the progressive objectification and the ever more subtle partitioning of 
individual behavior” (Foucault, 173). This hierarchical organization is a type of disciplinary 
technology, in that it employs the method of each individual assuming that they are being 
watched, and in turn, the individual acts according to the norm being observed. It may require 
individuals to do the surveilling, but the importance lies on the internalization of the observation. 
The hierarchical relations of observation function to enforce the disciplinary power over 
individuals.  
What is there to be observed? Why is it so important that this surveillance be pervasive, 
subtle, and discreet while also existing everywhere, all at once? The behavior of individuals is 
meant to be observed, studied, and once behavior has been accounted for, then there is a 
normalizing judgement to be passed. To observe behavior acted out by individuals is to measure 
and record data and then correct these individual’s behavior from the inside out by passing this 
normalizing judgement. Conformity is encouraged and non-conformity is deemed an offense. 
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The norm is a set of regulations, but it also relies on the study of individuals and the calculation 
of averages among them. “In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it 
individualizes making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialties, and to 
render the difference useful by fitting the one to another” (Foucault, 184). Within disciplinary 
power, if the norm is not achieved, then the punishment is to always be corrective. One is not 
locked up in a dungeon or sentenced to a beheading for not conforming; rather, one is 
encouraged and instructed on how to eventually reach that norm. Visibility and the act of 
observation allow for this norm to be studied, enforced, repeated, and be deemed culturally 
intelligible. Without individuals presenting themselves within the world or within a particular 
institution, then the knowledge of whether or not the individual has reached the norm would not 
be possible.  
To determine whether or not the norm has been reached there exists an examination. The 
examination is essentially a combination of the hierarchical observation and the normalizing 
judgement. It is meant to expose the effectiveness of the training, and it’s a method to judge the 
inheritance and internalization of the enforced norm. It is the assurance that these disciplinary 
mechanisms are both enforcing power and creating power. Existing within the constant visibility 
within this world, disciplinary mechanisms enforce power within these “spaces of surveillance.” 
The mechanisms are subtle, but effective. The power is not only enforced over individuals so 
that a desired norm is established, but the power is also a productive power. Through enforcing 
these disciplinary mechanisms, the individual is corrected from the inside out, and their identity 
is shaped through abiding by the disciplinary mechanisms. Disciplinary mechanisms produce 
power because the disciplines are internalized and the individual begins the surveil 
herself/himself. The disciplinary power becomes a part of the individual and begins to emit itself 
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through that individual. Through encouraging conformity, power is given, because if disciplinary 
methods are successfully enforced, then an efficient, productive citizen will endure. If the 
examination proves that the individual has not accurately internalized the norm in place, then 
further correction is enforced until the individual eventually reaches the norm. This is why the 
disciplinary power can be considered a productive power and not ultimately a restrictive power. 
Panopticon/Panopticism 
 A concrete example of these disciplinary methods (including hierarchical organization, 
normalizing judgments, and the examination) that shape identity is given within the section 
entitled “Panopticism” within Discipline and Punish. While this section does give a concrete 
example of Foucault’s disciplinary power and its ability to shape an identity, it is important to 
note that Panopticism can be applied to any institution within society. The importance of 
visibility is exemplified here, and the malleability of bodies is enforced within the Panopticon. 
The Panopticon, an ideal space of surveillance, represents the method of internalization and 
automation of disciplinary power within the individual through the methods of visibility. The 
inmates within the Panopticon are to always assume that they are being watched, even if they are 
not, and this influences their behavior at all times. They are constantly visible and escaping that 
is not an option. A self-surveillance is induced; the disciplinary power becomes a part of the 
individual through the constant assumption of observation. Through this self-surveillance that is 
enacted, the individual begins to correct herself/himself by abiding by the norm. It is important 
to remember that the Panopticon is not a static architecture; Panopticism is generalizable across 
all fields. It is a mechanism or technology of power that can be applied to any institution to 
enforce a particular norm through repetitive disciplinary practices that exist within this space of 
visibility. The Panopticon shows how it is important not to get wrapped up in solely the gaze 
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coming from the observation tower. Visibility, as I said before, is more than just simply being 
viewed. This whole concept of power relations is involved within visibility. Simply being gazed 
upon is not enough to shape an identity, power relations are required for this. Power relations 
permeate society and to exist is to exist within a visible world where these power relations 
function. Gilbert Caluya, in his article “Post-panoptic society? Reassessing Foucault in 
surveillance studies,” emphasizes the importance of Foucault’s entire concept of power in the 
discourse of surveillance. The gaze alone is not effective enough to influence behavior and 
employ normalizing techniques upon individuals. The spaces where visibility under these 
operations of power work as “an instrument of control or regulation of those who are visible” 
(Marquez, 22) can be termed a “space of surveillance.” Within the spaces of visibility there exist 
different mechanisms of power, and these power relations are what influence identity. Both 
visibility and the concept of power are important in the formation of identity. Simple observation 
does not have the capability to manipulate.  
Productive Power/Constructing Sexuality 
The capability to correct and shape an identity comes from Foucault depicting power that 
is not ultimately repressive but something that is productive in its function. The production exists 
within the discourse that is repetitive and reinforces norms, and through this repetitive discursive 
practice identities are created and designated to or taken up by particular individuals. The power 
of repetitive discursive practices and the influence they have on identity is depicted within the 
first volume of The History of Sexuality. Foucault questions why in modern times we see our 
identity so bound up with sexuality. He produces a genealogy of the development of sexuality, 
and he argues that it is wrong to assume that it is a static, natural trait. Since the seventeenth 
century, Foucault explains that there has been an explosion of discourses on sex in order to gain 
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knowledge concerning it. First, it began with the confessional within the church, and then the 
psychiatric and medical curiosity began to take hold. Foucault argues that through this discourse 
we have socially constructed sexuality. There is nothing in particular about our physiology that 
implies a certain sexuality. Sexuality has come to be known through the rapid expansion of 
sexual dialogue in the name of knowledge. Through sexuality being observed and studied so 
readily, there have been definitions and labels placed upon sexuality. These labels that have been 
placed on particular sexualities are entered into discursive practices, and the reiteration of these 
labels constitute them as norms. The norms, through the function of discourse, allow sexuality 
greater visibility, and in turn, identities are bound up and/or measured against the norms. Before 
the incessant curiosity concerning sexuality, there did not exist a specific identity that was 
culturally intelligible that could be applied to an individual.  This relates to disciplinary power 
through the repetitive measures that exist within defining a sexuality. Just like the soldier or the 
prisoner abided by disciplinary norms and internalized them through repetition, a sexual identity 
can also be constructed through the recurring normative definitions discussed within psychiatric 
and medical dialogue. Enforcing norms requires a visible dialogue and culturally intelligible 
identities are created through the repetitive enforcement of norms.  
Foucauldian Identity Formation (Gender Identity) 
The concept of sexuality being constructed and the importance of Foucault’s concept of 
power have influenced modern feminist philosophers in their discussion of sex/gender norms. 
Being visible within the world has now been tied up with this concept of having to articulate a 
particular sex and gender that one identifies with. These feminist thinkers are concerned with the 
construction of gender and sex, and ultimately argue that visibility, which encompasses a 
presentation, disclosure, and reiteration of discourse, causes one to identify with a particular 
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gender or sex related to the norms within the society in question. Playing off of Foucault’s 
concept of disciplinary power and his explanation on the construction of definitive sexualities, 
one can see how these mechanisms can be applied to heteronormativity and its reinforcement of 
the gender/sex binary.  Foucauldian ideas help Sandra Lee Bartky and Judith Butler back up their 
claims that gender and sex are indeed constructed. Bartky discusses how gender is constructed, 
and Butler takes it a step further and argues that sex itself is constructed through discourse. 
Before I focus on how each thinker uses Foucault to back up these claims it is important to 
elaborate on how Foucault’s work can be applied to the heteronormativity.  
Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power is relevant to heteronormativity because just 
like the institutions of the prison and the school, heteronormativity is continued through 
normalized, repetitive discourse. Foucault explains how bodies and subjects are created through 
disciplinary powers, which can be used to help describe how sexed bodies are created. Through 
observation, normalizing judgement, and an examination the body is studied, defined, and a 
sexual identity is bound up with this body. Visibility within a “space of surveillance” implies 
these three aspects of disciplinary power, and as said about the Panopticon, these are diffuse and 
can even be applied to the body. Does one’s gender match up with one’s sex and vice-versa? If 
not, then how can we identify this person so that their gender or sex is culturally intelligible? 
How can we expand this ‘norm’ within the institution of sex/gender identity construction? 
Within the visible world there exists a reiteration of a sex/gender dichotomy that is enforced 
upon and internalized in individuals. The repetitive, discursive disciplinary power of sexuality, 
which exists because of visibility, enforces the idea that one has to define their sexuality by or 
against the set norms produced through discourse. The constant visibility in the world that 
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expects one to present oneself in one sexual form or another encourages a self-surveillance of 
sexuality, just as the Panopticon did to inmates.  
Bartky emphasizes the reinforcement of gender norms and their placement onto specific 
biological differences. This reinforcement exists within the visibility that is inescapable living 
within a social world, and without the repetitive discourse, then there would not be a 
dichotomous set of gender norms to identify with or against. In the article, “Foucault, 
Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power,” she uses Foucault’s concept of 
disciplinary power to describe how the disciplines of the feminine norm are applied to women. 
Performative actions exist within a visible world of presentation, and she wants to examine the 
performative actions that produce a body that is considered feminine. Three categories of gender 
norms are considered in her analysis: “those that aim to produce a body of a certain size and 
general configuration; those that bring forth from this body a specific repertoire of gestures, 
postures, and movements; and those directed toward the display of this body as an ornamented 
surface” (Bartky, 65). The individual is always visible and is constantly being subjected to these 
gender norms. Through these disciplinary practices the feminine body-subject is constructed.  
“In the regime of institutionalized heterosexuality woman must make herself ‘object and 
prey’ for the man: It is for him that these eyes are limpid pools and this cheek baby-
smooth. In contemporary patriarchal culture, a panoptical male connoisseur resides 
within the consciousness of most women: They stand perpetually before his gaze and 
under his judgement. Woman lives her body as seen by another, by an anonymous 
patriarchal Other” (Bartky, 72).  
With this anonymous Other residing within the conscious of the woman, there begins a type of 
self-surveillance that resonates with Foucault’s theories. If a woman is expected to comply with 
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the feminine norms of society, then a sense of shame is acquired if she feels as if she has to 
measure up to these norms and is not able. The need to conform to these norms and the shame 
that comes along with not measuring up comes from an internalization of this patriarchal 
disciplinary power—the anonymous patriarchal Other. Bartky thinks that there needs to be a 
reconstruction of the categories of masculinity and femininity and that “femininity as a certain 
‘style of the flesh’ will have to be surpassed in the direction of something quite different, not 
masculinity, which is in many ways only its mirror opposite, but a radical and as yet unimagined 
transformation of the female body” (Bartky, 78). Maybe a solution to this radical transformation 
of the female body can be found within an exploration in the female body itself and the identity 
of ‘woman’ as being constructed through repetitive discursive practices within Judith Butler’s 
work.  
Not only can the reinforcement of gender norms create a feminine body, but the repetitive 
discursive practices that exist within a disciplinary power can be argued to create a female body 
as well. This concept of gender norms is applied within Judith Butler’s chapter “Subjects of 
Sex/Gender/Desire” within Gender Trouble. Within this article Butler wants to show how the 
performative power of gender norms creates a sexed body. This performative power can only 
exist within a space of visibility. Without visibility then there would be no resonation of the 
performance. As I stated earlier in my paper, visibility implies a presentation, or an appearance. 
She begins by questioning whether or not the concept of ‘woman’ as having a universal 
significance is founded upon factual grounds and whether or not there is a commonality among 
women that can define them as ‘woman.’ She concludes that representational discourse and the 
performative power of reiteration undermine the idea of there being a universal concept of 
‘woman’ behind the discourse itself. She thinks that “it is not enough to inquire into how women 
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might become more fully represented in language and politics. Feminist critique ought also to 
understand how the category of ‘women,’ the subject of feminism, is produced and restrained by 
the very structures of power through which emancipation is sought” (Butler, 5). She is concerned 
that the categorization of ‘women’ that feminism propagates might actually be limiting in its 
scope. She questions whether forming a category termed ‘woman’ is actually a reification of a 
normative gender dichotomy. The identity that is bound up with a female anatomy defined as 
“woman” is deemed culturally intelligible through the performative power of gender within the 
spaces of visibility.  
 Butler claims that gender can not only be thought of as a cultural creation, but that gender 
has to be conceived of as having a performative power. To clarify, gender is performed and is 
constituted through the performance itself. The performance is the gender identification; 
therefore, the performance has the power to create a gendered identity. This is why Butler claims 
gender to have a performative power. Through the performance of gender, that is bound to exist 
within a space of visibility, a sexed body is identified and assigned to an individual. A body 
exists and then the sex is read back into the particular physiological differences in the body. 
Gender must “designate the very apparatus of production whereby the sexes themselves are 
established” (Butler, 11). The performative power of gender is the means to the end which is sex 
being thought of as a prediscursive phenomenon. She does not want to state that the body is a 
medium on which cultural meaning is deterministically placed, but rather that the body itself is 
constructed—at least the identities bound up with the human physiology. She claims that the 
body comes into being through the performative power of gender; gender norms are read back 
into specific physiological differences and then these differences are in turn seen to define what 
set of gender norms should be abided by. A body is observed, a normalizing judgement is placed 
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upon it, and there exists a subtle examination to determine whether or not one’s identity is 
correctly correlated to a specific set of sex and gender norms. Within spaces of visibility the 
disciplinary power of heteronormativity is applied to individual bodies, and they are given a 
particular sexual identity through this strict dichotomy.  
Within the article entitled “Bodies That Matter,” Butler describes how the discourse 
involving the sex of individuals is perpetuated by this regulatory ideal, or normative discourse. 
The binary of heterosexuality saturates the dialogue surrounding sex, and this process of 
discourse has a productive power. Compulsory heterosexuality, or heteronormativity, has “the 
power to produce—demarcate, circulate, differentiate—the bodies it controls” (Butler, 235). 
Through this thought process, bodies are not originally sexed, but rather their sex is materialized 
through the normative discourse constituted through heteronormativity. The materiality of the 
binary sexed bodies is an effect of this discursive, productive power. “In other words, ‘sex’ is an 
ideal construct which is forcibly materialized through time. It is not a simple fact or static 
condition of a body, but a process whereby regulatory norms materialized ‘sex’ and achieve this 
materialization through a forcible reiteration of those norms” (Butler, 236). Butler points out that 
the necessity of the reiteration of the norms implies that the materialization is never complete. 
This reiteration requires visibility to hold sway over the shaping of identities, and the norms of 
the performativity of gender that are created and reinforced through the reiteration are read back 
into a body, and a ‘sex’ within the binary institution of heterosexuality is created. 
How is gender performativity related to this materialization? Butler makes sure to point 
out that the concept of performativity is a continuing process of reiteration and should not be 
naively construed as representing a single act. A multitude of acts exist within spaces of 
visibility, and this is what helps define bodies, enforce identities upon them, and to create 
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cultural intelligibility. This performativity works to materialize bodies, and without this 
reiteration and performativity, then there would be no sexed body. This evolution of thought is a 
culprit in the development of the discourse on sex. There is no sexed body outside the domain of 
the power of performativity and hegemonic discourse. “Sex is, thus, not simply what one has, or 
a static description of what one is: it will be one of the norms by which the ‘one’ becomes viable 
at all, that which qualifies the body for life within the domain of cultural intelligibility” (Butler, 
236). This conception of discursive powers creating the sexed body is obviously using Foucault’s 
theory of disciplinary power. For Foucault, a subject is formed through the power relations and 
disciplines; there is no subject before the interaction with the world. Just as a soldier is created 
through the interactions with the military institution and its disciplines, the “I” of a sexed body is 
formed through the process of assuming a sex within the performative, discursive practice. The 
subject is formed through a process of inclusion and exclusion; the subject is certain things and is 
not certain things. The heterosexual imperative and its binary limitations result in a category of 
abject beings: “the abject designates here precisely those ‘unlivable’ and ‘uninhabitable’ zones of 
social life which are nevertheless densely populated by those who do not enjoy the status of the 
subject, but whose living under the sign of the ‘unlivable’ is required to circumscribe the domain 
of the subject” (Butler, 237). These ‘abject beings’ who disrupt the social norms of the 
heterosexual imperative can be used “as a critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very 
terms of symbolic legitimacy and intelligibility” (Butler, 237) within a space of visibility.  
The sexed body is not necessarily a replica of the law (the normalizing, heterosexual 
imperative); the law mobilizes the performative actions of the body being sexed and gendered. 
One can take up the norms of the law or dissimulate them to form a sexed body. The law is not a 
guarantee that only the norm will be followed; there can be a divergence from the law. Despite 
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divergence, spaces of visibility allow discourse surrounding sexed bodies to be historically 
grounded, and they make the intelligibility of bodies possible. A subject is not formed out of 
nowhere, but through the context of the world in which the subject lives. The accumulation of all 
the discourse throughout time is used within the formulation of the subject. This accumulation 
can never be separated from gender performativity and the sexed body. The norms that guide the 
discourse of sexed bodies call into question how those beings that are not conforming to the 
norms and are excluded from the category of a ‘sexed body’ can create a rearticulation of what 
qualifies as a body that matters. In “Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire” Butler states that “the notion 
that there might be a ‘truth’ of sex, as Foucault ironically terms it, is produced precisely through 
the regulatory practices that generate coherent identities through the matrix of coherent gender 
norms” (Butler, 23). The power relations within compulsory heterosexuality that produce a law 
of norms, that is the binary of the masculine/feminine and male/female, do not require that 
gender and sexuality become an exact replica of the law itself, but that “the productions swerve 
from their original purposes and inadvertently mobilize possibilities of ‘subjects’ that do not 
merely exceed the bounds of cultural intelligibility, but effectively expand the boundaries of 
what is, in fact, culturally intelligible” (Butler, 39). Those subjects that do not abide by the norms 
of the binary heterosexual institution have helped to expand the notion of what can be considered 
a norm in the first place. Visibility allows for individuals to be identified as a particular sex, but 
it also allows for individuals to refute this designation and create one all of their own.  
 The refutation of compulsory heterosexuality happens within a space of appearance, so 
this will be discussed further in a later section. Despite there being some leniency on how one 
identifies with a particular norm, it seems as though even if there is an ‘abnormal’ identification, 
it is always defined by and against the dichotomous norm. Either way, whether it is a ‘normal’ or 
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‘abnormal’ identification, both are created through repetitive discursive practices, and these in 
turn make identities culturally intelligible and allow for an individual to associate oneself with a 
particular identity. Michel Foucault argues that student, worker, and soldier identities are created. 
Sandra Lee Bartky claims gender identities are constructed. Judith Butler concludes that the 
sexed body itself is a product of repetition. The normative discourse on a soldier, a student, a 
worker, or a sexuality all work in a repetitive way to form an identity. Within a space of 
visibility, a presentation or performance of the self is required, and through this performative 
power that is subject to the normative institutions, an identity is articulated. Without this 
discourse surrounding particular identities, whether it be a sexual identity or the identity of a 
soldier, it would be difficult to have culturally intelligible beings. The cultural intelligibility and 
the materiality of these norms is created through the discursive practices. The repetitive nature of 
disciplinary power creates definitive identity formations that are placed upon individuals or 
internalized by individuals. This power that forms identities is subtle yet the effects are visible at 
all times, and this may be the cause for the confusion of identity being constant and at the same 
time elusive. In other words, identity, at an intuitive level, seems to be a familiar and constant 
aspect of one’s life, but since the discursive phenomenon influencing identity is at times so 
subtly assumed and not questioned, this results in an elusive aspect of identity. Discursive 
influence on identity is inevitable because we are bound up within this world of visibility that is 
inescapable and, these definitive identities have become culturally intelligible through this 
presentation and performance within this visible world.  
While the disciplinary power that forms identities is not a sovereign power, it seems as 
though that the effects of a “space of surveillance” can be a bit domineering. If one concludes 
that this particular space of visibility is a bit deterministic, then I am not sure this would be far 
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off. It is deterministic in the sense that identities become a part of a cause and effect scenario. 
The “space of surveillance” forms identities that do not exist outside of the normative discourse. 
Those that do not adhere to the institutional framework of identity—whether it be militaristic, 
pedagogical, or heteronormative—are deemed as culturally unintelligible. The identities formed 
within a “space of surveillance” are always created through the normative discourse, and even if 
someone is considered ‘abnormal’ then this identity is still defined by and against the normal. 
The “space of surveillance,” despite having dogmatic undertones, cannot be ignored. Foucault 
was onto something when he explored how institutional normative discourse had an effect on 
identity. The space is lacking, and through Hannah Arendt a space is given that supplements this 
limiting view of identity formation. The “space of appearance” is not meant to refute the “space 
of surveillance;” rather, the “space of appearance” provides a place for individuals to disclose an 
identity that does not necessarily abide by the normative discourse. It is a space for the ‘abject 
beings’ or the ‘abnormal’ to disclose themselves, challenge the pre-existing norms, and create 
new discursive practices surrounding their ‘abormality.’ Despite the “space of appearance” being 
a supplement to the “space of surveillance,” there is still some common ground between the two 
that can be worked with. The performative aspect of identity can be found in both spaces. Within 
a “space of appearance” there is no denial of the existing world that includes the institutional 
frameworks that constitute normative identity constructs, but the space does allow for new norms 
to be disclosed and considered culturally intelligible. The “space of appearance” allows for a 
performance of identity that is not completely wrapped up in historical normative discourse. The 
normative discourse cannot be forgotten though, so we cannot leave Foucault completely behind.  
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Space of Appearance (Hannah Arendt) 
Hannah Arendt did not focus on the concept of identity specifically, but I will be able to 
use her work to contribute to my inquiry into identity formation. The aspect of her philosophy 
that will contribute to this inquiry on identity formation is her concept of action and the role this 
plays within the “space of appearance.” Action and its association with two other fundamental 
human activities (labor and work) will be discussed later, but for now I think it is important to 
describe what the “space of appearance” is and how the concept of natality is necessary for this 
discussion. The “space of appearance” is a type of visibility that is different from the “space of 
surveillance.” The concept of visibility being a broad concept of existing within a world where 
total isolation is near impossible is employed within Arendt as well. Where the “space of 
surveillance” is used as a means of coercion and control, the “space of appearance” provides an 
area where people can disclose their identity within the context of the world but with the ability 
to divert from the normative structures discussed within a “space of surveillance.”  
“The space of appearance comes into being wherever men are together in the manner of 
speech and action, and therefore predates and precedes all formal constitution of the 
public realm and the various forms of government, that is, the various forms in which the 
public realm can be organized. Its peculiarity is that, unlike the spaces which are the 
work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the movement which brought it 
into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men—as in the case of great 
catastrophes when the body politic of a people is destroyed—but with the disappearance 
or arrest of the activities themselves” (Arendt, 199). 
Honors Senior Thesis | Shelby Purdy 
 
26 
 
People are necessary for the “space of appearance,” and they are the root of this space. Without 
being visible to others, then the space ceases to exist. There is no room for disclosure of being in 
a world of isolation and alienation, according to Arendt.  
The “space of appearance” relies on Arendt’s concept of natality. Natality is important 
for all of Arendt’s philosophy. It is a concept that represents the lack of stagnation within the 
world. There is always a birth of new, unique beings. Not only is natality represented in the 
concrete act of birth, but it is also exemplified in word and deed.  
“With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world and this insertion is like a 
second birth, in which we confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original 
physical appearance . . . This beginning is not the same as the beginning of the world; it 
is not the beginning of something but of somebody, who is a beginning himself. With the 
creation of man, the principle of beginning came into the world itself, which, of course, is 
only another way of saying that the principle of freedom was created when man was 
created but not before” (Arendt, 177).   
Natality is a part of how Arendt is contrasted with Foucault’s deterministic identity formation 
standpoint. Since every person is a new beginning from birth, and through word and deed they 
are able to insert who they are into the world and create a completely new beginning, this allows 
for a fight against a complete social construction of identity. Identity formation, from Arendt’s 
perspective, does not subject the individual to being a creature of institutional discipline. Natality 
is confirmed in her entire thesis and is rooted in all three fundamental activities of human 
existence—labor, work, and action. “Labor assures not only individual survival, but the life of 
the species. Work and its product, the human artifact, bestow a measure of permanence and 
durability upon the futility of mortal life and the fleeting character of human time. Action, in so 
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far as it engages in founding and preserving political bodies, creates the condition of 
remembrance, that is, for history” (Arendt, 8-9). All are rooted in natality because they are all 
constant forms of creation. Each fundamental activity of human existence—labor, work, and 
action—make the world in which we live possible. Labor and work help to ensure the world that 
future people will enter. Natality is a concept of action because every time a new person is born 
they contribute to the plurality of the human experience and have the capability to start 
something completely new. The formation of identity that I am extracting from Arendt will not 
imply that individuals are simply creatures of the institution like Foucault implied. Rather, 
identity can be created within the element of action and plurality that Arendt claims. There is not 
a deterministic view of a person because this concept of natality is inherent in her notion of the 
human condition. The human condition is one in which human beings are constantly creating and 
recreating their identity and the world around them. The human condition is based on natality 
and action and speech are necessary to articulate this dynamic sense of identity and the world. 
Arendt does not want to imply that human beings are continually creating new identities; she 
recognizes that the world around us conditions our existence. Everything that someone comes 
into contact with turns into a condition of their experience of the world.  
“The impact of the world’s reality upon human existence is felt and received as a 
conditioning force. The objectivity of the world—its object- or thing-character—and the 
human condition supplement each other; because human existence is conditioned 
existence, it would be impossible without things, and things would be a heap of unrelated 
articles, a non-world, if they were not the conditioners of human existence” (Arendt, 9). 
The Human Condition provides a less deterministic view of identity formation and allows for an 
individual to present one’s identity in a public setting rather than the institutions creating the 
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identity as a whole. The term ‘condition’ itself implies a particular mode of being with respect to 
circumstances. “Condition” does not ignore the pre-existing world. Instead, it uses the context of 
the world to shape that particular mode of being. This is different than a deterministic view, 
because under that view the world is the sole cause of an identity. Identity formation cannot 
escape the normative discourse existing within the world under a deterministic view. What is 
important for Arendt is that there is an air of active engagement in identity formation, rather than 
passive manipulation brought about by institutional normative discourse. The active, rather than 
passivity, is what Arendt is concerned with, and is ultimately what is important for my thesis.  
Throughout history, at least up until modern times, vita contemplativa has been deemed 
of higher importance and a more prized way of life than any in the category of vita activa. The 
life of the philosopher in Plato’s ideal polis is regarded as cultivating the most freedom and the 
adequate lifestyle of a ruler over the people. A monk lives a secluded life delving into the 
mystery of the cosmos. “The primacy of contemplation over activity rests on the conviction that 
no work of human hands can equal in beauty and truth the physical kosmos, which swings in 
itself in changeless eternity without any interference or assistance from outside, from man or 
god” (Arendt, 15). The high esteem given to vita contemplativa, while not completely misplaced, 
has resulted in the vita activa being seen as only necessary to serve the needs of the vita 
contemplativa.  The vita activa is what Hannah Arendt focuses on in her book The Human 
Condition, and she wants to make it clear that she is not refuting the importance of the vita 
contemplativa, only that through its primacy it has sequestered the importance of the vita activa.  
Arendt points out that the vita activa is characterized by three fundamental human 
activities, as mentioned earlier—labor, work, and action. Action is ultimately what is important 
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in the context of my thesis, but it is important to explain what she means by labor and work in 
detail before expounding upon the relevance of action.  
Labor 
 While at first it may seem to be irrelevant and confusing to distinguish between labor and 
work, Arendt actually does define the two in a coherent way. The term labor is meant to imply the 
acts that we perform that provide for the basic necessities of life, such as eating and shelter. To 
labor is to be enslaved by the necessities of the body. Arendt’s concept of labor is different than 
that of Marx. Marx explains labor as being purely production, but Arendt explains labor as being 
more like re-production. In other words, labor is performed in order to sustain a person within 
production.  This is one justification the Greeks tried to propose for slavery. They wanted to focus 
their time on a philosophical, contemplative lifestyle or devote their time to the political arena, and 
they did not find this possible if they had to constantly worry about how they were going to satisfy 
their bodily needs. To be a slave was the worst possible fate for the Greeks because it implied that 
you were doomed to carry out the necessities of life, whether it be for oneself or for a master. “The 
institution of slavery in antiquity, though not in later times was not a device for cheap labor or an 
instrument of exploitation for profit, but rather the attempt to exclude labor from the conditions of 
man’s life” (Arendt, 84). The effort that is put into labor to satiate one’s basic, bodily need is futile 
because the end product is always consumed. Labor is essentially Sisyphean because there is never 
an end to the life-sustaining process. More food will always need to be consumed and having 
shelter is always preferred.  The effort of labor may be futile, but it is certainly necessary. Labor 
is necessary because it sustains the biological functions of life.   
 The fruits of labor are not durable or permanent; rather, the end products are always 
consumed and never become a part of the world. The animal laborans, or the laboring human, 
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does not choose to not procure objects that have a permanence; rather, the animal laborans is a 
slave to the body and to necessity. They are banished to the home to make sure the needs of the 
production class are met. Re-production becomes their only identity and they are incapable of 
freedom from this. Re-production describes the duties that provide for the well-being of the 
productive class. “The burden of biological life, weighing down and consuming the specifically 
human life-span between birth and death, can be eliminated only by the use of the servants, and 
the chief function of ancient slaves was rather to carry the burden of consumption in the household 
than to produce for society at large” (Arendt, 119). The identity tied up with animal laborans 
allows for the others to pursue these loftier desires and allowing them to focus their energy not on 
providing for the basic necessities of life, but opening up their time towards contemplation or 
political agendas. 
Work 
 While the term ‘work’ may seem to be synonymous with the term ‘labor,’ it connotes 
something entirely different for Arendt. Work is meant to depict the concrete, material objects 
that human beings create while they are living. It implies the durability of the world despite the 
mortality of the human being who created it. “The work of our hands, as distinguished from the 
labor of our bodies—homo faber who makes and literally ‘works upon’ as distinguished from the 
animal laborans which labors and ‘mixes with’—fabricates the sheer unending variety of things 
whose sum total constitutes the human artifice” (Arendt, 136). In other words, work is the man-
made, created world that surrounds us.  
“Although Arendt does refer to worldliness as ‘the capacity to fabricate and create a 
world’ (PF:209), worldliness requires more than mere fabrication, since it implies our 
attachment to, and care for, worldly things Arendt appears to include both material 
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objects like buildings, tools and works of art, and the less tangible but not necessarily less 
durable forms of cultural, legal and political institutions, including the ‘web’ of human 
relationships and narratives that pre-exists every individual, sets the context for their 
activities. And shapes the way actors are understood, responded to and remembered” 
(Browing, 18).  
While it is supposed to depict concreteness and durability, this is not meant to insinuate that 
work cannot wear over time or that it cannot be destroyed. For example, if one buys a car, which 
is a piece of work within the world, and does not take care of it properly and use it consistently, 
then the car will eventually cease functioning. It is no longer an active piece of work within the 
world. The same goes for legal institutions. A long-lasting law can be struck down by a 
contradicting case brought up. Durability does not imply immortality. 
“The life process which permeates our whole being invades it, too, and if we do not use 
the things of the world, they also will eventually decay, return into the over-all natural 
process from which they were drawn and against which they were erected. If left to itself 
or discarded from the human world, the chair will again become wood, and the wood will 
decay and return to the soil from which the tree sprang before it was cut off to become 
the material upon which to work and with which to build” (Arendt, 136-137). 
While work may seem to be more durable and less futile than the means and ends of labor, it is 
still not to be deified and considered immortal. The creating of these artificial things is 
constituting ‘worldliness.’ Worldliness does not consist of solely mental thought or the laborious 
activities that do not procure stability. Worldliness is the character that humans have created—
the lasting artifacts made by human beings. While labor is required to survive, work is not, but 
many do argue it necessary for a fulfilling life. Some claim that to have a meaningful life one 
Honors Senior Thesis | Shelby Purdy 
 
32 
 
must create something that is longer lasting then life itself. Work is always meant to be seen as a 
means/ends process, unlike labor. Labor’s means is a strong labor force which produces the ends 
which are the life sustaining substances, but the ends of labor immediately become means again 
once they are being consumed to sustain life. Work, on the other hand, produces objects that are 
an end in themselves and are not intended to be biologically consumed—a sculpture, for 
example. The end product of work is independent of people and it adds to the man-made 
‘worldliness.’  
It is important to note that the tools and instruments that are made by the process of work 
can help eliminate the burden of labor, at least to some extent. They have not gotten rid of the 
necessity of life; rather, they have been made by homo faber to ease the duties that labor 
provides. In a slave society it is apparent that there are certain necessities in life that are being 
fulfilled by the slaves, but the industrial revolution has hidden this burden to a certain extent. 
“The danger here is obvious. Man cannot be free if he does not know that he is subject to 
necessity, because his freedom is always won in his never wholly successful attempts to liberate 
himself from necessity” (Arendt, 121). If everything seems so easy all of the time, then one does 
not notice the necessity and does not attempt to overcome it. The industrial revolution has 
created an epidemic of labor. Workmanship is not as prevalent and the labor force is used to 
created objects that are meant to be consumed and not kept for a long period of time—hence the 
capitalist, consumer society. “The ideals of homo faber, the fabricator of the world, which are 
permanence, stability, and durability, have been sacrificed to abundance, the ideal of animal 
laborans” (Arendt, 126). 
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Action 
 Now that I have explained the differences between labor and work, one a life-sustaining 
force and the other a process of creating worldliness, I will begin to explain what Arendt’s 
concept of action is, how it relates to identity formation, and how the “space of appearance” is 
involved. Natality is central here because it is what allows for a dynamic space of word and 
deed. The plurality of individuals is a breeding ground for new ideas and fresh, progressive 
action, and without this then the concept of action would be static and our world would be caught 
in a stifling, conservative place. Natality is inherent in labor and work, but it is most important in 
Arendt’s concept of action because for her this is where political and social change is possible. 
“Action is distinguished from labor because it is free rather than determined by necessity; and it 
is distinguished from work because, as Aristotle defined praxis as opposed to poiēsis, it  is an 
end in itself rather than simply a movement or process towards an external end” (Browing, 24). 
While someone’s identity may be tied up with their slavish like personality, if they’re constantly 
laboring, or tied up with the craft they perform under the category of work, Arendt wants to 
ultimately argue that one’s identity, who one is and not what one is, is defined in the context of 
action. Action consists of speech and acts and “this disclosure of who somebody is, is implicit in 
both his words and his deeds; yet obviously the affinity between action and beginning is closer 
than that between speech and beginning, although many, and even most acts, are performed in 
the manner of speech” (Arendt, 178). This concept of beginning is important for Arendt’s 
analysis of action. Each person born allows for a new beginning—a new set of actions that are 
possible. To act is to take initiative and this initiative begins when a new person is born. 
Arendt claims that the basic human condition of action is plurality, or in other words, all 
humans are the same in the sense that nobody is. Uniqueness is the defining factor of a human, 
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even if one is influenced by the worldliness surrounding them, and each time someone is born 
they have the capability to disclose a ‘who’ that has never existed before. What is this ‘action’ 
that discloses ‘who’ one is?  
“It should be evident already that Arendt’s definition of action is broad and not always 
precise or consistent, combining the spontaneous initiation of something new with the 
display of exemplary deeds, the exemplification of noble ideals, and the republican ideal 
of political exchange in the public sphere. The ambiguity in the meaning of action is 
perpetuated by her tendency to couple the term with ‘speech’” (Browing, 14).  
Through action and speech a ‘who’ is revealed.  This ‘who’ that is disclosed may be rooted in 
natality, but this does not imply that they are born onto a completely white blank page. Who one 
is is disclosed through the dynamic interaction of word and deed, and this dynamic interaction is 
a part of natality. Despite the new beginnings, there is a world that they are born into—a 
worldliness created by previous generations and particular necessities one must adhere to—and 
this world is the backdrop on which a ‘who’ is disclosed.  
“When action is coupled with speech it immediately assumes an important relationship to 
worldliness, for communicative action now appears to be the means by which the world 
of things becomes tangible and real. On the one hand, the distinctiveness of unique 
individuals only appears when there is a common objective world—a stable structure of 
public institutions, spaces and things—which, as the table gathers together those who sit 
around it, ‘relates and separates men at the same time.’ On the other hand, the objectivity 
of the world appears only when it is talked about and shared, only when it is a public 
world ‘distinguished from our privately owned place in it” (Vita Activa, 15).  
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She claims that ‘who’ one is does not become apparent until the disclosure among other beings 
takes place—hence her emphasis on plurality. Without disclosure of a ‘who’ in action and 
speech, then they both simply lose their specific revelatory character and become a mere 
achievement among others. Arendt does want to point out that it is hard to truly capture who one 
is through language because once one starts to describe who they are or who someone else is, 
then the language starts to sound like an explanation of what one is. Who one is may be revealed 
in speech, but it is hard to articulate what is revealed in speech. The disclosure of the ‘who’ is 
more accurately revelatory to the others listening and watching the disclosure; who someone 
wants to disclose does not always succeed in coming across. For instance, I may want a 
particular characteristic about myself to be vivid to others, but this does not necessitate that they 
will actually notice it in either my words or deeds. “This unchangeable identity of the person, 
though disclosing itself intangibly in act and speech, becomes tangible only in the story of the 
actor’s and speaker’s life; but as such it can be known, that is grasped as a palpable entity only 
after it has come to its end” (Arendt, 193). Arendt essentially has a narrative identity framework; 
once someone has completed their life-story in death, then the ‘who’ of that person can be 
revealed. Also, it seems that from the previous quotation, Arendt would claim that the world and 
the ‘who’ of an individual is created within this disclosure. There is a world that an individual is 
born into and there is already a worldliness that has been cultivated over time, but, as stated 
earlier, worldliness also consists of a cultural durability. This cultural durability is created 
through action and speech of the species.  
 The identity that is disclosed through action and speech relies on a space of appearance 
that is inherently social. Multiple people are required for a disclosure of identity to occur and 
without someone to watch and listen to this disclosure, then the content of the disclosure is void. 
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Even if a person writes a memoir, the disclosure is still happening in the occurrence of someone 
else reading it. The “space of appearance” cannot exist without a multitude of people. Through 
this concert of action and speech that is inherent in the “space of appearance” a social world is 
created and through this social aspect a political realm emerges. “The political realm rises 
directly out of acting together, the ‘sharing of words and deeds.’ Thus action not only has the 
most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity 
which constitutes it” (Arendt, 198).  Action in Arendt’s terms is what creates a social world 
where different perspectives can be interchanged and debated. This space allows for social 
change and disclosure of identity. Arendt prizes the Greek polis as being the perfect example of a 
“space of appearance;” therefore, in the next section I will discuss how the polis relates to the 
“space of appearance” and then argue that modern social media has the same framework. 
Through both of these a disclosure of identity and social change have the possibility of 
occurring. 
Greek Polis and Social Media 
 Among Plato and the Greek gods and goddesses, if you took anything from ancient Greek 
studies then it was probably the concept of the polis. Polis is a term for the Greek city-state. Each 
polis had its own judicial, legal, religious, cultural, and political differences, but they all had the 
same structure. Poleis were considered a breeding ground for art, philosophy, and political 
debates. They are essentially large cultural centers that bring the community together to discuss 
the world surrounding them.  
“The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the 
organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true 
space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen 
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to be. ‘Wherever you go, you will be a polis’: these famous words became not merely the 
watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and speech 
create a space between participants which can find its proper location almost any time 
and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the 
space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like 
other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly” (Arendt, 198-199).  
Arendt clearly points out that a “space of appearance” cannot exist without an interaction of 
multiple people. The polis is the prime example of this space and once the people disperse the 
space no longer exists. It does not matter where or with whom this space occurs so long as there 
are multiple people participating in action and speech. Once again it is clear that the “space of 
appearance” and action itself are inherently social. The polis, when viewed as the city-state 
structure, is an attempt at rendering this “space of appearance” and action permanent. There was 
always a place for the Greeks to congregate and disclose their identity and particular social, 
legal, and philosophical issues.  
Social media is a modern day polis, and in turn a modern version of the “space of 
appearance.” What is social media though? The term seems intuitive, but some have actually 
found it hard to define. In an article discussing how advocacy groups have used social media to 
facilitate civic engagement and collective action there is a tentative definition given:  
“Kaplan and Haenlein define social media as “a group of Internet-based applications that 
build on the ideological and technological foundations of Web 2.0, and that allow the 
creation and exchange of User Generated Content.” Web 2.0 refers to the software 
platform that gave birth 'to the technology that we currently understand as social media. 
The term “was first used in 2004 to describe a new way in which software developers and 
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end-users started to utilize the World Wide Web; that is, as a platform whereby content 
and applications are no longer created and published by individuals, but instead are 
continuously modified by all users in a participatory and collaborative fashion” 
(Jonathan, 7-8). 
This definition clearly expresses how social media is a collaborative effort; it is inherently a 
“space of appearance.” It is similar to the polis in both the concrete and dynamic sense. From 
here on out it can be assumed that social media, no matter the kind, will always exist on the 
internet and will forever provide a space for multiple people to interact. This is how social media 
is like the concrete city-state concept of a polis. In the dynamic sense, there will always be new 
social media platforms introduced and different conversations with different people occurring. It 
allows for people from all around the world to come together on a particular technological 
platform and discuss issues relevant to their lives. Social media allows for connection across 
borders, race, class, gender, etc. In the same article quoted above it is reported that the advocacy 
groups surveyed found social media to be a great benefit to getting their message out: 
“The majority of advocacy groups surveyed noted in their open-ended responses that 
social media provide a variety of benefits that help facilitate civic engagement and 
collective action. These benefits are organized here into four sections: 1) Social media 
help connect individuals to advocacy groups and thus can strengthen outreach efforts; 2) 
social media help promote engagement as they enable engaging feedback loops; 3) social 
media strengthen collective action efforts through an increased speed of communication; 
and 4) social media are cost-effective tools that enable advocacy organizations to do more 
for less.” (Jonathan, 13-14). 
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The polis was a hub of communication on all fronts and a place for the community to 
discuss hot topic issues they were facing. The previous sentence could replace polis with 
social media and I think it would still be coherent. Yes, social media is a host for 
narcissism and mundane pictures, but social media also provides a platform for people to 
come together to discuss relevant topics, whether they agree or disagree. The poleis of 
Greece and social media are both the epitome of a “space of appearance.” The “space of 
appearance” allows for a disclosure of being and a disclosure of the world—both social 
media and a polis have the capability of providing this type of space.  
Arendtinian Identity Formation (Gender Identity) 
 The Greek polis was brought into discussion because it is a concrete example that Arendt 
uses to describe the “space of appearance”—just like Foucault used the Panopticon to exemplify 
the “space of surveillance”—and the important role that action plays within it—both word and 
deed. It is known that women held an inferior status to men, despite the sacred Goddesses. Men 
were overwhelmingly the center of historical, political, and philosophical thought in Ancient 
Greece and women were subordinated to the domestic sphere. The purpose of this paper is not to 
discuss the limiting lifestyle of women in Ancient Greece though; rather, how the polis can be 
compared to social media is what is of interest in terms of gender identity. Even if women in 
Ancient Greece were permitted to discuss feminism in the polis, it is not well documented. 
Social media is a different story. People from all around the globe are discussing feminist issues 
in all of their complexities through the platform of social media. It provides a space where 
people of all different race, gender, ethnic, class, religious, and social backgrounds can come 
together to discuss relevant issues. “While the role of community media is to challenge 
prevailing social norms and to ensure equitable gendered relations, the role of state media is to 
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amplify the national identity of the nation-state” (Isaacs-Martin, 140). Here community media 
represents social media—they are essentially the same thing. Community media is controlled by 
the community, hence the name. Social media is a form of community media because it allows 
for a wide-range of individuals to come together to debate particular topics without a particular 
rhetoric being engaged by a national identity. This national identity is associated with state 
media. State media is mass media controlled by the state; the dialogue here is controlled by 
social norms that are deemed acceptable by that particular media source, for example, a news 
broadcast or website. Social media allows for individuals to break past the rhetoric of social 
norms and discuss how the norms are integrated into society and how people are capable of 
transcending them.  “One objective of community media is to ensure that women within a 
community can develop and produce forms of communication to articulate their experiences. 
Community media constitutes an important interface for the negotiation of difference and 
representation of the other” (Isaacs-Martin, 140). This “space of appearance,” community media 
(social media), provides of space for people to come together and challenge particular societal, 
social, and biological norms concerning what it is to be a particular gender. Normative gender 
identity has the capability to be discussed and ultimately challenged when people of all different 
backgrounds have the capability to come together and have productive conversations on the 
gender identity. It is also a space where gender performativity can occur, and through this 
heteronormativity can be challenged rather than passively adhered to like it is within a “space of 
surveillance.” Through these platforms identities that do not adhere to the normative framework 
are disclosed and seen as culturally intelligible. Once this space has been created, gender identity 
has the capability of expanding away from normative standards that society employs for its 
benefit. 
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 As stated earlier, Arendt does not think that people are born onto a white blank page. She 
recognizes that people are born into a complex world and total isolation is nearly impossible. 
This world that one is born into is obviously going to have an influence on one’s identity. Gender 
identity is even effected because people are born into a world with heteronormativity. What is 
important for Arendt though is this concept of natality in action. In our words and deeds we are 
able to incite change and challenge the existing world views. The “abject beings” that Judith 
Butler discusses are a good example of this. The “abject beings” challenge what is considered to 
be the norm within the world, and a “space of appearance” gives them the capability to bring 
about a new way of being.  
“Literally speaking, natality is the condition of being born, which Arendt lyrically 
describes as ‘being a new beginning’. The faculty of action depends on the condition of 
natality because action is ‘to begin something new’, and only a being which is a new 
beginning is capable of making a new beginning; that is, freedom can only arise from 
something that is not the determinate product of a causal chain.” (Browing, 22-23). 
Since natality is such a core concept to Arendt’s theory of action, natality is also an important 
aspect of gender identity formation from Arendt’s standpoint. Action exists within a “space of 
appearance” and within this space people have the freedom to disclose themselves. This 
disclosure, through word and deed, is always a new identity. To clarify, the new identity is 
always within the context of a pre-existing world—a world that can be challenged. Another 
central idea within Arendt’s theory of action is plurality, so each person that is born contributes 
to the plurality of the world. Each person born has the capability have acting and speaking in a 
way that was not spoken before, and through this pre-existing identity standards can be 
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challenged. The ‘abject beings’ are free to disclose their identity, even if it is met with resistance, 
within the “space of appearance”.  
Identity is constructed within a range of potential social options. The dominant Western 
system of gender has made it difficult for those whose gender falls somewhere between 
or outside of the binary system to understand and accept themselves or to be recognized 
as socially legitimate. Gender is achieved in social interaction with others, and to achieve 
accountability as a social actor, one must enact gender in ways that are socially 
recognizable and decodable (West and Fenstermaker 1995). But gender is also "a feature 
of social relationships, and its idiom derives from the institutional arena in which those 
relationships come to life" (West and Fenstermaker 1995, 21; West and Zimmerman 
1987). Further, gender and gender belief systems are inherent components of the social 
infrastructure (Lorber 1994). Consequently, gender- and we would argue, gender 
identity-is learned and achieved at the interactional level, reified at the cultural level, and 
institutionally enforced via the family, law, religion, politics, economy, medicine, and the 
media. (Gagne, 479). 
It cannot be denied that heteronormativity has an impact on gender identity, but what is 
important here is that gender identity is formed at the ‘interactional level.’ Arendt wants to argue 
that identity is formed within this social space—the “space of appearance.” When Judith Butler 
describes people who do not conform to the binary as ‘abject beings’ she regards them as such 
because they are seen this way in light of societies standards. Whether or not one conforms to the 
heterosexual binary or is a gender anarchist, both are still forming their identity within a social 
space. The identity is performed, or disclosed, within the “space of appearance.” It is articulated 
in the presence of others, and without others the identity would not be discernable. Arendt is a 
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proponent of the narrative self-story, or in other words, she claims that who one is is discovered 
through an interaction with other beings, and their life-story is discovered through a plethora of 
interactions and disclosures of word and deed. From Arendt’s standpoint, an identity is created 
over time, through a performative disclosure among others, and is not complete until the life is 
over. Even from this point of view we cannot forgot about Foucault and the “space of 
surveillance.” What was learned from his perspective was that the world provides normative 
discourses that cannot ignored. They will have an effect on one’s identity, but the “space of 
appearance” provides place for people to challenge the normative discourse and reroute the 
discourse itself. 
Conclusion 
States of seclusion and isolation are very appealing in the hectic world in which we live, 
but one cannot stay secluded for long. Living necessarily implies an interaction with the world, 
and visibility is inherent in all interactions. To reiterate, this broad concept of visibility does not 
only encompass an observation. Visibility implies a space where there is a disclosure, 
observation, and rumination on the knowledge gained. Within these spaces of visibility, both a 
“space of surveillance” and a “space of appearance,” there is a repetitive nature of disclosure in 
order for an identity to be coherent.  A Foucauldian concept of identity formation includes a 
concept of disciplinary power, discursive practices, and an institutional framework of identity 
formation. The “space of surveillance” is a means of correction and control. The disciplinary 
power uses normative discourse to coerce individuals to abide by a particular norm. 
Internalization of the norm is the ultimate goal, and if the goal is not achieved, then individuals 
are encouraged to eventually achieve the desired set of normative standards associated with the 
institution in question. Hannah Arendt provides a supplement to the Foucauldian view of identity 
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formation, in that she gives a more liberating and empowering view of identity formation. This 
supplement allows people to not simply be creatures of the institutional disciplinary techniques 
or cogs in an identity machine. Arendt provides an analysis of action, which ultimately shapes 
ones identity by disclosure through word and deed, and this provides a more optimistic view of 
identity formation. An individual, through word and deed within a “space of appearance,” is able 
to freely disclose their identity without a normative framework pressing them to conform. Arendt 
does not contest a pre-existing world that includes pre-existing ideologies, philosophies, beliefs, 
and identity frameworks, so we cannot get rid of the “space of surveillance.” There are certainly 
dichotomous identity frameworks, especially when it comes to gender identity. This cannot be 
ignored and this is why Foucault’s theories are so important. Arendt simply provides a more 
liberating view of the matter; she provides the “space of appearance” for individuals who do not, 
or do not want to, fit the normative mold. The “space of appearance” allows people to combat 
the normative discourse and reevaluate and redefine what can be considered normative in the 
first place. The discursive practices discussed by Foucault that occur within a “space of 
surveillance” certainly influence the action that is performed within a “space of appearance,” but 
influence not imply determinism.  
Normative binaries can be questioned and challenged in this space. The “abject beings” 
Judith Butler discusses are now given a space to become legitimate subjects and begin 
articulating a socially acceptable gender identity. Heteronormativity may provide pushback 
towards these “abject beings,” but the “space of appearance” gives them an area to present 
themselves freely, possibly around others who will not have a hostile reaction, and create a 
possibility of losing the term ‘abject’ associated with their identity. The performance of gender, 
heavily articulated within the “space of surveillance,” can also happen within the “space of 
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appearance.” Within the “space of surveillance,” the performance is measured against the 
normative discursive practices, whereas within a “space of appearance,” individuals are able to 
perform a gender that does not adhere to heteronormativity, and by their performance they are 
redefining what gender has the capability of personifying. As discussed previously, Butler argues 
that the performance of an identity is what materializes the identity, so in a “space of 
appearance” the ‘abject beings’ have the opportunity to materialize an identity that does not 
conform to the normative standards of society or a particular institution. As quoted earlier, these 
‘abject beings’ who disrupt the social norms of the heterosexual imperative can be used “as a 
critical resource in the struggle to rearticulate the very terms of symbolic legitimacy and 
intelligibility” (Butler, 237). The Foucauldian “space of surveillance” may be the source of the 
normative standards of cultural intelligibility, but Arendt’s “space of appearance” provides a 
supplement to this view by recognizing the normative standards that hold sway over performance 
and disclosures, but it gives an opportunity to let them go and redefine what counts as ‘normal’ 
and culturally intelligible. 
The attempts at control and coercion expressed by a “space of surveillance” through 
disciplinary, discursive practices sometimes prove successful. Many find themselves caught in a 
dichotomous, restrictive formation of their own identity, and I think it is safe to assume that 
some never question the dichotomy and its effect on their identity in the first place. Through 
reading Arendt I have discovered a space, the “space of appearance,” where the normative 
institutional framework no longer has to hold absolute sway of an individual’s identity. These 
institutions cannot be thrown out and they are certainly important for analyzation of identity, but 
the “space of appearance” provides a space where identity can be disclosed freely without the 
intention of control. 
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